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Throughout our species history, humans have created pictures. The
resulting picture record reveals an overwhelming preference for
depicting things with minds. This preference suggests that pictures
capture something of the mind that is significant to us, albeit at
reduced potency. Here, we show that abstraction dims the perceived
mind, even within the same picture. In a series of experiments, people
were perceived as more real, and higher in both Agency (ability to do)
and Experience (ability to feel), when they were presented as pictures
than when they were presented as pictures of pictures. This pattern
persisted across different tasks and even when comparators were
matched for identity and image size. Viewers spontaneously discrim-
inated between different levels of abstraction during eye tracking and
were less willing to share money with a more abstracted person in a
dictator game. Given that mind perception underpins moral judge-
ment, our findings suggest that depicted persons will receive greater
or lesser ethical consideration, depending on the level of abstraction.
mind perception | prosociality | moral judgement | eye tracking |
dictator game
Human history is awash with pictures. By 40,000 y ago, cavepainting was already established (1). Today, humanity uploads
billions of photos per day (2). This extraordinary temporal reach is
matched by extraordinary geographical reach. Pictures abound on all
continents and are produced by virtually all cultures (3, 4). Across
this staggering abundance of images, a clear preference in subject
matter emerges: things with minds. Cave paintings around the world
depict humans, animals, and their interactions (1). Social media
services host more images of people than of any other image cate-
gory (5, 6). This preoccupation with minded subjects suggests that
pictures capture something of the mind that is significant to us.
In pictorial representations, some features of the depicted re-
ality are lost, and others are preserved. For example, a photo of a
tiger loses the scale and motion of the tiger but may preserve its
spatial layout and coloration. In this study, we focus on one critical
feature of reality that pictures preserve—the capacity to contain
pictures. In the same way that reality contains pictures, pictures
too may contain pictures. This feature is intriguing, as it introduces
a recursive structure in which different levels of abstraction may
be nested.
Some terminology will be useful in distinguishing these levels
of abstraction. We refer to the real world as Level 0 (L0 for short).
Most of our visual experiences—including the people and objects
in our surroundings—are L0. Pictures within this environment are
designated as Level 1 (L1). Cave paintings, family photos, and
television images are all examples of L1. Pictures within such
pictures are Level 2 (L2). The program for your local art gallery is
packed with L2 pictures. Fig. 1 summarizes this scheme.
The sheer prevalence of minded beings in pictures raises the
question of how mind perception and pictorial abstraction in-
teract. Some mental attributes do not survive projection into
pictures. We do not expect portraits to strike up a conversation.
Nevertheless, some embers of mind perception can be detected.
For example, pictures of eyes can direct our attention (7); “being
watched” by photographic eyes can enhance prosocial behavior
(8). Such findings betray perception of a mind behind the depicted
eyes. One possible interpretation is that pictures carry the same
signal as reality but at reduced strength.
To summarize, on the one hand, pictures allow recursive
representation. A picture may contain another picture at a higher
level of abstraction. On the other hand, increasing the level of
abstraction may decrease the potency of the subject. A picture in
the environment just does not have the same force as the envi-
ronment itself. Combining these two observations suggests a novel
hypothesis: L2 pictures should be less potent than L1 pictures. For
pictures of people, this raises the prospect of graded mind per-
ception for different levels of abstraction. The purpose of the
current experiments is to test this possibility.
Comparing degrees of mind perception requires a quantitative
framework. There have been various proposals as to how mind
perception can be quantified, including its dimensionality (9–11).
Perhaps the most influential of these is the two-dimensional
framework proposed by Gray, Gray, and Wegner (9). This frame-
work emerged from a principal component analysis of mind per-
ception data from a large-scale survey. The analysis identified a
primary factor of Experience (ability to feel), pertaining to moral
patiency and rights, and a secondary factor of Agency (ability to do),
pertaining to moral agency and responsibility. Adopting this frame-
work, we predicted that attributions of Experience and Agency
should distinguish L1 and L2 depictions of people. If successive
abstractions temper the perceived mind, observers should attribute
lower Experience and Agency to people in L2 pictures compared
with people in L1 pictures. In short, we predict that mind perception
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will differ between pictures and pictures of pictures, even though
both are pictorial representations.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to compare the perception of
minds in L1 and L2 pictures using a two-alternative forced choice
(2AFC) task. To this end, we presented participants with a series
of onscreen photos. Each photo contained two people—one in L1
and the other in L2 (Fig. 2A).
For each picture, the participants’ task was to indicate which
person 1) seemed more real, 2) seemed higher in Experience, or 3)
seemed higher in Agency. The Realness comparison allowed us to
test whether mind perception is related to how real the person
seems (11). We reasoned that if mind perception recedes with in-
creasing abstraction, participants should perceive L1 as higher than
L2 in terms of Experience, Agency, and Realness.
Results and Discussion. Participant responses are summarized in
Table 1. One-sample Student’s t tests confirmed that the pro-
portion of participants choosing L1 over L2 was significantly above
the chance level of 50% for Realness [t(28) = 17.99, P < 0.0001,
d = 3.34], Experience [t(28) = 9.10, P < 0.0001, d = 1.69], and
Agency [t(28) = 5.70, P < 0.0001, d = 1.06]. That is, on all three
dimensions, minds were perceived more keenly in L1 than in L2.
Viewers consistently perceived people in L1 as more real than
people in L2. They also attributed more Experience and Agency
to people in L1 than people in L2. These findings are consistent
with an abstraction cost in mind perception, whereby an addi-
tional layer of abstraction blunts the portrayed mind. Cohen’s
(12) “rules of thumb” for interpreting effect sizes suggests a
d value of 0.2 as a small effect, 0.5 as a medium effect, and 0.8 as
a large effect. Following these guidelines, the level of abstraction
had a large statistical effect (d > 1) on all three dimensions. Our
next experiment examined the magnitude of this abstraction cost
using a different behavioral measure.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we sought to measure the magnitude of the
observed abstraction cost by asking participants to rate each of the
two depicted people in each display for perceived Realness, Agency,
or Experience. These responses were given along a numeric rating
scale ranging from 0 to 10. This change from forced choice response
to separate ratings allowed us to estimate the size of the effect on a
common scale and to examine generalization across different tasks.
Results and Discussion. Participant ratings are summarized in
Table 2. Paired-sample Student’s t tests confirmed that partici-
pants rated L1 higher than L2 for Realness [t(106) = 8.62, P <
0.0001, d = 0.83], Experience [t(108) = 3.55, P = 0.001, d = 0.34],
and Agency [t(103) = 3.98, P < 0.0001, d = 0.39]. On all three
dimensions, minds were perceived more intensely in L1 than in
L2, demonstrating generalization beyond a 2AFC task.
Abstraction costs occurred whether viewers were asked to
choose between depicted people (Experiment 1) or to rate indi-
vidual people separately (Experiment 2). In the next experiment,
we ask whether differentiation between L1 and L2 requires a task
at all or whether it occurs spontaneously during passive viewing.
Experiment 3
The stimuli in Experiment 3 were the same as in Experiments 1
and 2. This time, however, no explicit mind perception task was
prescribed. Participants were simply asked to view the photos as
they normally would while looking behavior was monitored via an
eye tracker. Classic eye-tracking studies have shown that viewers
preferentially attend to people in scenes (13, 14). If differentiation
between L1 and L2 occurs even during free viewing, then eye
tracking should reveal systematic differences in looking behavior.
Alternatively, if differentiation between L1 and L2 requires an
explicit mind perception task, then no systematic differences
should emerge.
Fig. 1. Levels of pictorial abstraction and transitions between them. The
blue background indicates reality (L0), and the yellow background indicates
pictorial representation (L1 and L2). L0 (Left) refers to the visual environ-
ment as seen in live viewing. L1 (Center) refers to a picture of the visual
environment as seen in photographs. L2 (Right) refers to a picture of a
picture as when one photograph contains another. Transition 1 ascends one
level of abstraction, from L0 to L1. Transition 2 also ascends one level of
abstraction, from L1 to L2. Critically, Transition 1 bridges reality and pictorial
representation, whereas Transition 2 occurs within the domain of pictorial
representation.
Fig. 2. Schematic of viewing conditions. (A) Experiments 1 through 3 and 5.
Participants viewed faces at two levels of abstraction (L1 and L2) within the
same stimulus display. (B) Experiment 4. Half of the participants compared L0
to L1 (Left), and half compared L1 to L2 (Right). The blue background in-
dicates reality. The yellow background indicates pictorial representation.





Columns show the levels of abstraction compared by participants. Rows
show the three dimensions of comparison. Cells show the mean percentage
of participants who chose L1 and L2 for each dimension.





Columns show the levels of abstraction rated by participants. Rows show
the dimensions of the three dimensions for rating. Cells show the mean
rating that participants gave to L1 and L2 for each dimension.
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Results and Discussion. Eye-tracking data are summarized in
Fig. 3. Looking behavior distinguished between L1 and L2 rapidly
and spontaneously. Fixations initially favored L2, possibly reflecting
early scene segmentation. This was followed by a more extended
preference for L1, consistent with deeper social processing, after
which the distinction between L1 and L2 lapsed.
Repeated-measures ANOVA confirmed that the interaction
between level of abstraction and fixation number was statistically
significant [F(5.64, 197.53) = 19.45, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.211].
Pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences between L1
and L2 at fixations 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 (P < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected;
SI Appendix). In sum, viewers’ distinction between L1 and L2 was
evident from the very first eye movement. This observation estab-
lishes some important boundary conditions. Differentiation be-
tween people at different levels of abstraction occurs spontaneously
in the absence of task demands. Its effects emerge within the first
moments of exposure and guide subsequent visual exploration.
So far, all of our experiments have presented a range of nat-
uralistic scenes. This approach leaves open the possibility that
characteristics of our stimulus set could account for the observed
differences. For example, it is possible that L1 and L2 differed
systematically in terms of facial appearance, giving rise to sys-
tematically different mental attributions (15). Previous work has
shown that some faces look more real than others (16). Similarly,
Gray, Gray, and Wegner (9) found that some people elicit higher
Experience and Agency ratings than others (e.g., people of dif-
ferent ages). A more superficial difference was image size. L1
faces were generally bigger than L2 faces in terms of visual angle.
In principle, this size difference could also influence participants’
responses. The purpose of Experiment 4 was to replicate the
picture abstraction cost while addressing these concerns.
Experiment 4
To equate facial appearance across levels of abstraction, we
created new presentations in which the same individuals appeared
in L1 and L2. To rule out possible effects of image size, we matched
image size across conditions. If the pattern in Experiments 1 to 3
was an artifact of stimulus selection, then it should be eliminated
here. If the pattern was due to a change in the level of abstraction,
then it should persist, despite the new matched stimuli.
We also took this opportunity to place the magnitude of the
picture abstraction cost in context by comparing transitions be-
tween different levels of representation (Fig. 2B). In Transition
1, we asked viewers to compare a live face (L0) to an L1 picture
of a face. Given that people readily distinguish between reality
and pictures (17, 18), we expected that viewers would perceive L0
as higher in Realness, Experience, and Agency than L1. Transition
1 thus provides a baseline against which to compare transitions
between different levels of pictorial representation. In Transition
2, we asked viewers to compare an L1 picture with an L2 picture
as in the preceding experiment. We expected that viewers would
again perceive L1 as higher in Realness, Experience, and Agency
compared with L2.
Finally, if there is something “special” about the transition
from reality to representation, the observed picture costs should
be larger for Transition 1 (L0 versus L1) than for Transition 2 (L1
versus L2). Alternatively, if transitions among different levels are
equivalent, the picture costs in Transition 1 and Transition 2
should be of similar magnitude.
Results and Discussion. Participant responses are summarized in
Table 3.
For Transition 1, binomial tests on each dimension confirmed
that the proportion of participants choosing L0 over L1 was
significantly above chance (Realness: z = 7.3, P < 0.000001,
Cohen’s g = 0.37; Agency: z = 7.5, P < 0.000001, g = 0.38; Ex-
perience: z = 6.7, P < 0.000001, g = 0.34). For Transition 2, the
proportion of participants choosing L1 over L2 was significantly
above the chance level of 50% for Realness (z = 3.9, P < 0.0001,
g = 0.20) and Agency (z = 5.1, P < 0.000001, g = 0.26) but not for
Experience (z = 1.5, P = 0.134, g = 0.08). That is, L2 depictions
seemed lesser than L1 depictions in terms of Realness and
Agency but retained apparent Experience.
χ
2 tests revealed that, on each dimension, the preference for
the lower level was stronger in Transition 1 than in Transition 2
(Realness: χ2 = 7.58, degrees of freedom [df] = 1, P = 0.0059,
Cramer’s V = 0.2069; Experience: χ2 = 15.18, df = 1, P < 0.0001,
V = 0.2865; Agency: χ2 = 4.1, df = 1, P = 0.0429, V = 0.1562). A
transition within the picture domain incurred a significant ab-
straction cost but not as great a cost as a transition from reality
to pictures.
It may not be surprising that mind perception differs for pictures
versus reality. After all, pictures lack many characteristics of their
real-world counterparts, including characteristics that may contribute
to mind perception (e.g., movement, sound, three-dimensional pres-
ence). What is more surprising is that mind perception differs be-
tween pictures and pictures of pictures. This disparity cannot be
explained by an appeal to special properties of reality, as the relevant
comparison concerns only different regions of the same image. The
striking implication is that levels of abstraction can influence mind
perception independent of physical substrate. In the final experiment,
we examined behavioral consequences of this perceptual effect.
Experiment 5
Economic games have long been used in experimental psychol-
ogy to examine factors that influence behavior in everyday social
interactions (19). In the dictator game (20), the participant
controls a sum of money. The participant’s task is to decide how
Fig. 3. Eye-tracking data from Experiment 3. Fixations 1 to 10 (starting
central fixation excluded), averaged across all participants and stimulus
displays. Data points show proportion of fixations to L1 person (thick line)
and L2 person (thin line). Error bars show SE.
Table 3. Summary results of Experiment 4
Transition 1 Transition 2
Dimension L0 L1 L1 L2
Realness 87 13 70 30
Agency 88 12 76 24
Experience 84 16 58 42
Columns show the levels of abstraction compared by Transition 1 partic-
ipants and Transition 2 participants. Rows show the three dimensions of
comparison. Cells show the percentage of participants arriving at each
judgement.
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much of this money to allocate to a recipient. The recipient has
no influence over the size of the allocation, and the participant
keeps whatever is left.
Part of the appeal of the dictator game is its external validity as
a measure of fairness and prosociality. Behavior in the dictator
game is associated with prosocial personality traits (21–23), and
the size of allocation predicts prosocial behavior in a variety of
real-world tasks (24, 25). More importantly for the current study,
the size of allocation is also sensitive to the social salience of the
recipient (26–28).
By analogy with manipulations of social salience, we hypoth-
esized that pictorial abstraction would reduce dictator game al-
locations by reducing the perceived mind of the recipient. To test
this possibility, we compared monetary allocations to L1 or L2
recipients in an online experiment. To relate behavior to per-
ception, we ran a one-shot dictator game in the context of the
mind perception task from Experiment 4. We expected that 1)
participants would again perceive L1 as higher than L2 in terms
of Realness, Agency, and Experience, 2) participants who were
asked to make dictator game allocations to L1 would offer more
than participants who were asked to make allocations to L2, and
3) effects in the dictator game would be attributable to effects in
the mind perception task.
Results and Discussion.
Perceptual effects. Participant responses are summarized in Table 4.
Binomial tests confirmed that the proportion of participants
choosing L1 over L2 was significantly above the chance level of
50% for each dimension (Realness: z = 9.3, P < 0.000001,
Cohen’s g = 0.33; Agency: z = 7.7, P < 0.000001, g = 0.28; Ex-
perience: z = 7.4, P < 0.000001, g = 0.27). Once again, the level
of pictorial abstraction influenced mind perception.
Behavioral effects. In the dictator game, participants allocated a
share of their $10 endowment to either an L1 or L2 recipient
(between groups manipulation). One participant had missing
data. Dictator game responses are summarized in Fig. 4.
Dollar allocations were significantly higher for L1 (n = 99,
M = $5.48) than for L2 (n = 100, M = $4.42; Mann–Whitney U =
3,928.5, z = 2.51, P = 0.0121, Cohen’s d = 0.36), corresponding to
a picture abstraction cost of $1.06. L1 allocations exceeded L2
allocations in all four counterbalanced versions of the experi-
ment, demonstrating generality across recipients and images.
Individual differences in perception and behavior. Analysis of individ-
ual differences allowed us to trace these behavioral outcomes to
their perceptual antecedents. Participants who perceived L1 as
higher than L2 on all three dimensions (Realness, Agency, and
Experience; n = 114) differentiated strongly between L1 and L2
in their dictator game allocations (abstraction cost $1.49;
Mann–Whitney U N1 = 55, N2 = 59, U = 2,111, z = 2.77, P =
0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.54). Other participants (n = 85) did not
(abstraction cost $0.27; Mann–Whitney U N1 = 44, N2 = 41, U =
805, z = 0.85, P = 0.395, Cohen’s d = 0.19). Perceptual distinc-
tion begets behavioral distinction in this task.
A comparison with previous dictator game experiments allows
us to put the magnitude of the observed picture abstraction cost
($1.06) in context. Rachlin and Jones (26) asked participants to
imagine the 100 people closest to them arranged in order of
acquaintance, with 1 being socially the closest and 100 being the
most distant. Allocations from a $10 endowment were approxi-
mately $1 lower for position 10 recipients than for position 1
recipients. Charness and Gneezy (28) found that allocations
from a 25 Dutch guilder endowment ($13.74) were ∼2.25 guil-
ders ($1.24) lower for anonymous recipients than for recipients
with surnames. The picture abstraction cost is on this scale.
General Discussion
We began by noting that pictures capture something of the mind
that is important to us. Our core finding brings this notion into
sharp relief. Both L1 and L2 pictures are perceived as depicting
minds (albeit to a lesser degree than L0). Critically however, L1
pictures convey more mind than L2 pictures. We name this ab-
straction cost the Medusa effect after the mythical Gorgon
whose image lacked the petrifying power of her gaze (Fig. 5).
All five experiments indicate that the visual medium bears
some mental trace, more or less strongly, depending on the level of
abstraction. This mental trace fits with established social cognitive
effects that are induced by viewing pictures of faces [e.g., gaze cueing
(7), prosociality (8)]. As well as establishing an intriguing cognitive
phenomenon, the current findings suggest a novel hypothesis for
future experiments—that the social cognitive effects of faces may be
weaker at higher levels of pictorial abstraction as the depicted
mind recedes.
Gray, Gray, and Wegner (9) emphasized the ethical import of
dimensions of mind perception. For example, in their analysis,
Agency was especially correlated with deserving punishment for
wrongdoing, and Experience was especially correlated with the
desire to avoid harming. These dimensions capture Aristotle’s
distinction between moral agents (whose actions can be morally
right or wrong) and moral patients [who can have moral right or
wrong done to them (29)]. Our dictator game findings contribute
behavioral support for this framework by showing that the Me-
dusa effect impacts the treatment of others. There is some
precedent for picture factors affecting the treatment of depicted
people. For example, compassion fade refers to the finding that a
photograph showing several people in need elicits lower chari-
table donations than a photograph showing one person in need
(30, 31). However, the basis of the Medusa effect is entirely different.






Columns show the levels of abstraction compared by participants. Rows
show the three dimensions of comparison. Cells show the percentage of
participants arriving at each judgement.
Fig. 4. Summary results of the dictator game (DG) task in Experiment 5.
Bars show mean dollar allocations to L1 and L2 recipients. Error bars
show SE.
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We find that representational abstraction affects prosocial be-
havior, even when the number of depicted people is constant.
Although we focused here on L1 and L2, there is no in prin-
ciple limit to the levels of visual abstractions that may be nested.
Many artistic works contain multiple levels of abstraction (32).
Droste effects and infinity mirrors hint at infinite regress (33, 34).
How do people make sense of these structures? One possibility is
that viewers remain mentally anchored in L0. From this vantage
point, successive levels of abstraction recede into the mist, each
level more faint than the last. Another possibility is that viewers
mentally switch between levels as appropriate to the task at hand.
On this account, whichever level is adopted substitutes for L0
temporarily, and pictures within it substitute for L1 temporarily.
Only two levels of representation need to be managed at any
moment. These two possibilities generate diverging predictions.
For example, the anchored account implies that abstraction costs
can only go in one direction: minds at a higher level of abstraction
should always seem less potent than minds at a lower level of
abstraction. The switch account permits abstraction costs in either
direction: for a viewer inhabiting L1 (as when engrossed in a
movie), minds in L0 may be temporarily deprecated. Our finding
that an orientation to L2 frequently occurred in the first fixation
would seem to favor the switch account, with L1 temporarily oc-
cupying the ground level of perception. Comparing numeric rat-
ings for L0 versus L1 and L1 versus L2 could provide a more direct
test of alternatives. The switch account predicts that the latter L1
rating will converge on L0.
As well as their theoretical interest, our findings have impli-
cations for understanding pictures in the many applied settings in
which they arise. The past decade has seen a major shift from
face-to-face interaction to online interaction. In our parlance, this
shift increases the level of abstraction at which the interaction oc-
curs, from L0 to L1. In so doing, it also increases the level of ab-
straction for any pictures present in the interaction, from L1 to L2.
The implication is that mind perception is attenuated throughout
the whole stack. This is no mere intellectual curiosity. L2 images
now pervade legal, educational, and healthcare settings in which
regard for minds is paramount (35). To give a concrete example,
some psychological assessments involve reading social information
from faces (36). These faces are L1 pictures when the test is ad-
ministered in person but L2 pictures when the test is administered
online. In this context, the viewer’s response, and hence the diagnostic
outcome, could depend on the level of abstraction. Or consider
jurors weighing photographic evidence in a virtual trial, teachers
presenting visual materials online, and cyber bullies sharing pic-
tures of their victims. In all of these settings, outcomes hinge on the
sensitivity to the minds of others—precisely what is lost with an
additional layer of abstraction.
Such examples raise empirical questions about the nature and
scope of picture abstraction costs. One approach to addressing
these questions would be to identify conditions in which the Medusa
effect can be overturned, perhaps by manipulating a picture’s con-
tent (e.g., L1 robot versus L2 human) or format (e.g., static L1
versus moving L2). Another promising approach would be to ex-
amine individual differences between observers. Our dictator game
data suggest that some people may be less susceptible than others to
the Medusa effect. The range of susceptibility may reflect individual
differences in underlying cognitive abilities. For example, children
younger than 2 y can fail to distinguish between images and real
objects (37). Among adults, there are large individual differences in
face perception ability (38, 39). More generally, it is not clear
whether abstraction costs are specific to mind perception from faces
or whether they also apply to other judgements and other domains
or modalities (e.g., objects, language, and music). Future experi-
ments could test whether nonface objects such as houses look less
real, or less valuable, in L2 than in L1. For now, we show that faces
in the same image evoke mind perception to different degrees,
depending on their level of abstraction. All pictures are equal, but
some are more equal than others.
Methods
Research Ethics. All studies were approved by the University of British Co-
lumbia’s Behavioral Research Ethics Board (Experiments 1 to 3 and 5; Approval
No. H10-00527) or the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology,
University of York (Experiment 4; Approval No. 834). All participants gave
informed consent.
Experiment 1.
Participants. A total of 320 participants (41% female, 59%male; age range 19
to 80 y old) in the United States completed the study online from Amazon
Mechanical Turk in exchange for monetary compensation. Participants were
screened by Internet Protocol (IP) address to preclude repeat submissions.
Stimuli and design. The initial stimulus set comprised 30 photographs down-
loaded from the internet. Each photo depicted an L1 person and an L2 person
in a single scene. For example, a person (L1) holding a portrait photograph
(L2) or a computer user (L1) and onscreen interlocutor (L2). These scenes were
visually diverse, ensuring that L1 and L2 each varied in terms of size, quality, and
onscreen location (left or right). The depicted L1 and L2 persons also varied in
age, gender, race, and emotional expression. One scene depicting an infantwas
rejected during piloting. The remaining 29 scenes were cropped to a standard
size of 400 pixels high × 600 pixels wide and viewed on the participant’s own
device. Stimulus presentation and response capture were controlled using
Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to the Experience condition
(n = 106), the Agency condition (n = 106), or the Realness condition (n = 108).
For each scene, the participant’s task was to indicate which of the two people
seemed higher in the given attribute (Fig. 2A). This 2AFC method originated in
psychophysical research (40) in which it was developed as a sensitive measure
of perceptual discrimination (41).
Procedure. Participants accessed the study online from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Task instructions for each condition are shown in SI Appendix. Each trial
consisted of a single scene which was presented onscreen for 2 s. All par-
ticipants completed all trials in a different random order, pressing the “z”
key or the “m” key to indicate the selection of the person on the left or the
person on the right. The experiment was self-paced and took ∼5 min
to complete.
Experiment 2.
Participants. A total of 320 participants (32% female, 68%male) in the United
States completed the study online from Amazon Mechanical Turk in ex-
change for monetary compensation. Participants were screened by IP address
to preclude repeat submissions and to prohibit participants who had com-
pleted Experiment 1.
Fig. 5. The Medusa effect. The fictional Medusa (Right as L1) was reduced
in potency when viewed as an image in a polished shield (Left as L2). Credit:
National Gallery of Victoria, Melbourne. Gift of Professor Peter Tomory,
1991. This digital record has been made available on NGV Collection Online
through the generous support of the Joe White Bequest (Public Domain; see
SI Appendix).
Will et al. PNAS | 5 of 7





























































Stimuli and design. The same stimuli as Experiment 1 were used. Participants
were randomly assigned to the Experience condition (n = 109), the Agency
condition (n = 104), or the Realness condition (n = 107).
Procedure. Participants accessed the study online from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Their taskwas to rate each of the two people shown in an image based on
Experience, Agency, or Realness. Task instructions for each condition are
presented in SI Appendix. Each trial consisted of a single image presented
onscreen along with the attribute questions (e.g., Experience) presented im-
mediately above and below the image. The top question referred to the
person on the left side of the image, and the bottom referred to the person on
the right side. Participants answered each question by moving a slider to a
whole number along a scale ranging from 0 to 10. The trial order was ran-
domized. The experiment was self-paced and took ∼5 min to complete.
Experiment 3.
Participants. A total of 36 undergraduate students (79% female, 21% male,
age range 18 to 29 y old) from the University of British Columbia completed
the study in exchange for course credit.
Stimuli and design. The same stimuli as Experiments 1 and 2 were used. Each
participant was seated ∼57 cm from the 22-in computer screen at a resolu-
tion of 1,680 × 1,050 pixels. Participants were instructed to keep their head
steady during the experiment to ensure their eye movements would be
accurately monitored by a SensoMotoric Instruments (SMI) Red desktop eye-
tracking system with a sampling rate of 120 Hz, accuracy of 0.4°, and spatial
resolution of 0.03°.
Procedure. Participants completed a nine-point SMI eye fixation calibration.
They were then instructed to view the presented images as they normally
would. Images were displayed onscreen for 5 s with a 2-s central fixation cross
presented between trials. The experiment progressed automatically. Images
appeared in a random order. The experiment took ∼4 min to complete.
Experiment 4.
Participants. A total of 200 undergraduates from the University of York (age
range 18 to 25 y old) participated in exchange for a sweet reward. The first
100 participants were allocated to Transition 1, and the second 100 partic-
ipants were allocated to Transition 2.
Stimuli and design. Two final-year undergraduates (Person A and Person B),
who were unfamiliar to our first-year participants, volunteered as experi-
mental models. In advance of testing, each model was photographed from a
distance of ∼1.5 m using an iPhone 11 camera on portrait settings. Each
photo captured the whole of the model’s face with a neutral pose and no
occlusions from a roughly frontal aspect. The photos were cropped to 2,400
pixels high × 1,800 pixels wide and color printed at life size onto A4 sheets,
which were then laminated for use in the experiment.
This arrangement allowed us to counterbalance the two faces (Person A
and Person B) across twomodes of presentation so that each face appeared in
each condition an equal number of times. In Transition 1, participants
compared a live face (L0) against a life-size photograph (L1). A total of 50
participants saw Person A as L0 and Person B as L1. The remaining 50 saw
Person B as L0 and Person A as L1.
The stimuli for Transition 2 were photographs of the Transition 1 setup.
Immediately prior to testing for Transition 1, the live model was photo-
graphed from a distance of ∼1.5 m using the same camera as before. Each
new photo captured the whole of the model’s face together with the life-
size photo she was holding. These new photos were cropped to 1,800 pixels
high × 2,400 pixels wide and color printed onto A4 sheets, which were then
laminated for use in the experiment.
Transition 2 participants thus compared an L1 picture against an L2 picture.
A total of 50 new participants saw Person A as L1 and Person B as L2. Another
50 new participants saw Person B as L1 and Person A as L2. Fig. 2B summarizes
the situation for Transition 1 and Transition 2.
For both groups, the participant’s task was to answer the same three
questions set out in Experiment 1: Which person seems more real? Which
person seems to have more Agency (ability to do)? Which person seems to
have more Experience (ability to feel)? In this experiment, all 200 partici-
pants answered all three questions.
Procedure. For both Transition 1 and Transition 2, the two counterbalanced
versions of the experiment were run on consecutive days. On each day, the
experiment was set up at a temporary exhibition stand at the main entrance of
a university lecture theater 30 min before the beginning of class. For Transition
1, the live model (L0) remained seated behind a desk, holding the photo-
graphed face (L1) next to her own face. Passersby were invited to compare the
two faces and to answer the three 2AFC questions, concerning Realness, Ex-
perience, and Agency, on a printed response sheet.
On each day, testing halted when 50 participants had responded. For Tran-
sition 2, the procedure was the same, except that no live model was present.
Instead, participants compared the two faces presented on paper (L1 versus L2).
Experiment 5.
Participants. A total of 202 individuals (35% female, 65% male) from the
United States participated via Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for a
small payment. Participants were screened by IP address to preclude repeat
submissions and to prohibit participants who had completed Experiment 1 or
2. Two participants were excluded following an attention check, resulting in a
final sample of 200 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to the
L1 dictator game (n = 100) or the L2 dictator game (n = 100).
Stimuli and design. Stimuli were the photographs used for Transition 2 in
Experiment 4. These depicted Person A (L1) with a life-size photo of Person B
(L2) or Person B (L1) with a life-size photo of Person A (L2). To decorrelate the
level of pictorial abstraction (L1, L2) and spatial location (left, right), we used
both the original displays and their mirror images (i.e., horizontally inverted;
lettering removed to eliminate inversion cues). This addition resulted in four
versions of the experiment (one for each display) such that facial identity,
picture abstraction, and laterality were fully counterbalanced. In each version,
participants completed the mind perception task used in Experiment 4, de-
ciding which of two people (Person A or Person B) seemed higher in Realness,
Agency, and Experience. Participants then proceeded to a one-shot dictator
game using the same display. In the dictator game, the participants’ task was
to share a $10 endowment by allocating whatever dollar amount they chose
($0 to 10) to a specified onscreen recipient. In each version, participants were
randomly assigned the L1 person (total n = 100) or the L2 person (total n =
100) as the recipient, indicated by an onscreen arrow and text instructions. Our
main interest was whether participants in the L1 condition made higher dollar
allocations than participants in the L2 condition.
Procedure. The mind perception task always preceded the dictator game task.
Instructions for both tasks are reproduced in SI Appendix. The assigned stimulus
display, depicting Person A and Person B, remained onscreen throughout the
mind perception task. Three pairs of radio buttons, providing left/right person
options for Realness, Agency, and Experience, were presented immediately be-
low the display. For each of the three dimensions, participants chose the person
on the left or the person on the right. In the dictator game that followed, the
same stimulus display was presented again, this time with an arrow pointing to
either the L1 person or the L2 person, specifying the recipient. A slider showing
dollar units ($0 to 10) was presented immediately below the display. Participants
selected their allocation to the recipient by dragging the slider. After committing
the allocation, participants completed a final attention check by selecting option
four from a list of five options one through five. Two participants who failed this
attention check were excluded. The entire experiment took ∼5 min to complete.
Data Availability. All data have been deposited in a publicly acessible data-
base, the Open Science Framework, and can be accessed via the following
link: https://osf.io/fjp54/ (42).
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